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  The organizational structure of the cotton industry has attracted much scholarly attention, as it 
was regarded as one of the key factors explaining the international competitiveness of the industry.
1 On 
the one hand, Lazonick and others have condemned the reliance of Lancashire on vertically specialised 
(single-phase) firms, and its adverse consequences for co-ordinated investment in new technologies, 
transport costs and decision-making.
2 On the other hand, a number of authors have been highly 
sceptical on this interpretation of the advantages of vertical integration.
3 Particularly, it has been shown 
that the alleged benefits of vertical integration rarely manifested themselves in terms of superior 
international competitiveness or profitability.
4  
  The differences in business structure of the cotton textile industries across the World emerged 
relatively earlier. By mid-nineteenth century, English and French cotton firms were mainly vertically 
specialised whereas in the United States, Germany and Spain cotton firms were mostly vertically 
structured, combining spinning and weaving.
5 Even within the same country or region, several firms 
integrated vertically cotton spinning and weaving while others preferred to put their yarn into the 
market and, hence, were specialized. For example, within Lancashire, vertical integration was more 
common among cotton mills dedicated to coarse cloth than to those cotton mills devoted to fine 
goods.
6 Trends across countries were also conflicting: while vertical integration decreased 
progressively in England and France in the United States and Spain gained momentum over the 
nineteenth century.  
                                                 
1 A review of the literature is available in Jeremy, “Organization”. 
2 See Lazonick, “Industrial Organization” and Mass and Lazonick, “British Cotton Industry”. 
3 Perry (“Vertical Integration”, p. 185) defines vertical integration as the elimination of trade or contractual 
exchanges within the borders of the firm. 
4 See a review in Leunig, “New Answers”. 
5 On England see Taylor, “Concentration and Specialization”, Farnie,  English Cotton Industry, Lyons, 
“Vertical Integration”, Huberman “Vertical Disintegration”. On France, see Sicsic, “Firm Size”. On the 
United States, Temin, “Product Quality”. On Germany, Brown, “Market Organization”. 
6 Huberman, “Vertical Disintegration”.   1 
  In this international panorama, a very interesting phenomenon is the dramatic transition of the 
Spanish cotton spinning and weaving industry in practically two decades (from 1840 to 1860) from a 
market-based system of business relations to a system of vertically integrated firms, where yarn 
intermediate markets were replaced by internalisation. However, at the same time, other phases of the 
cotton production and trade remained vertically specialised: Barcelona cotton brokers and merchant-
houses organized the supply of raw cotton;
7 cotton-finishing firms were typically vertically specialised; 
and merchant-houses, agents and independent travellers carried with the marketing of finished cloth.
8  
  Precisely, this article investigates the choice of vertical integration of cotton spinning and 
weaving firms in Spain by mid-nineteenth century. The evidence indicates vertical integration in mid-
nineteenth century to be more related to the presence of asset specificity
9 in yarn intermediate markets 
than other factors. Instead, in other markets like those of raw cotton, semi-finished (grey) and finished 
cloth, where asset specificity problems appear to be less important, vertically disintegrated firms were 
more common.  
  Although this article focuses on the Spanish cotton industry, it may have a much broader 
significance since several of its arguments can serve to qualify the debate on the role of vertical 
integration into the development of cotton industry. The evidence collected in this article shows that 
the structure of intermediate markets could account for vertical integration. Consequently, regions with 
large markets for intermediate inputs and low concentration ratios, like Lancashire, would not need to 
develop vertically integrated firms to efficiently develop their cotton industry. Instead, for regions 
where the extent of intermediate markets was limited and concentration ratios were high vertical 
integration was the best option. It  also shows the weak relation between vertical integration and 
international competitiveness. Despite the preponderance of vertically integrated firms in cotton 
                                                 
7 Castañeda and Tafunell, “Mercado mayorista”. 
8 Prat and Soler, “Formación de redes comerciales”. 
9  The concept of asset specificity refers to the extent to which a particular investment might be used for 
alternative purposes.   2 
spinning and weaving, Spanish cotton industry had a limited participation in international markets and 
maintained its domestic market because was heavily protected by tariffs.
10   
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
     Like in many European countries, the development of cotton industry was central to early 
industrial development of Spain over the nineteenth century. This industry was the first to import 
power-steam technology and factory-based production from abroad.
11 Cotton textile mills were the 
single largest employer of manufacturing labour and the major private-owned manufacturing 
firms.
12 Although during the early industrialization period the cotton industry’s rate of growth 
outstripped all other Spanish industries its impact on overall growth rates was relatively limited. By 
1860, cotton textiles’ share in Spanish GDP was only between 1 and 2 percent.
13  
  The history of Spanish cotton industry is mainly concentrated in Catalonia.
14 Textiles were 
well established in the region, and Barcelona was an important urban textile centre, since thirteenth 
century. However, it was during the eighteenth century, and most especially after 1780s, that cotton 
textiles became an increasingly important dimension of the Catalan economy.
15 The concentration 
of textile producers in Catalonia magnified the impact on the regional economy. Because the 
geographic concentration of textile production, Catalonia industrialized more rapidly than did the 
rest of the country. Moreover, Catalonia was the largest cotton textiles producer in the 
Mediterranean basin although this industry was minuscule when compared with British or New 
                                                 
10 On the lower productivity of the Spanish cotton industry see Rosés, “Competitividad internacional” for mid-
nineteenth century and Clark, “Why isn’t the Whole World”  for early twenty century. 
11 Nadal, Fracaso. 
12 The data collected in Giménez Guited, Guia fabril shows that the cotton industry concentrated more than 
the 60 per cent of labour in manufacturing establishments of 50 or more workers. 
13 Rosés “Industrialización regional”, pp. 64-72. 
14 According to Gimenez Guited (Guia fabril), it produced about the 75 percent of the Spanish cotton 
textiles.  
15 By 1860, cotton textiles employed about one third of Catalan industrial workforce and about one tenth of 
overall workforce.    3 
England cotton industries. By 1850s, Catalan textile producers wowed about one-seventeenth of the 
British cloth and one-sixth of the New England’s cotton cloth.
16   
  The early development of cotton textiles in Catalonia was gradual and was marked as much 
by continuity  as by change. Nevertheless, transformation was not without its discontinuities; so, 
cotton industry in Catalonia passed through three successive phases (1720s-1780s; 1780s-1833; 
1833-1861).  
 
The early period (1720s – 1780s)
17 
  Imitating several of the economic policies of the British and French governments, provisions 
to encourage manufacturing expansion and economic development were introduced in Spain by the 
new Bourbon dynasty.
18 An initial ban on the import of Asian cotton textiles was implemented in 
1717 and was further extended in 1728 on European imitations. However, the legislation allowed 
the introduction of foreign cotton yarn. These measures provided an initial motivation for the 
development of cotton textiles in Catalonia; so, a first generation of enterprises devoted to weaving 
and printing cotton were established in Barcelona in the late 1720s. Nascent manufacturers for the 
first time sought to influence trade policy. Their lobbying had a long-standing impact on the 
provisions concerning cotton textiles, and during the most part of the eighteenth and the nineteenth 
centuries cotton textile producers won strong protection. Nevertheless, this new industry benefited 
not only from the government initiatives and protection but also from the relative abundance of 
merchants, artisans and machine-makers in Barcelona, and the ancient tradition of the region in the 
production of textiles.  
  The following decades witnessed a considerable growth in cotton printing production in 
Barcelona. At the industry heights in 1786, this city was the most important location of cotton 
                                                 
16 Rosés “Choice of Technology”, pp. 136-137. 
17 There is an ample literature on the history of the cotton industry in Catalonia during this period. See recent 
reviews at Sánchez, “Crisis económica” and Thompson, “Technological Transfer”. 
18 In these first developments see Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation.   4 
printing in Europe with 113 calico concerns.
19 Catalan calicoes were sold in the protected domestic 
markets and the Spanish colonies in America.
20 Simultaneously, there were also important 
improvements in the rate of technological innovation. By mid-eighteenth century, Catalan 
manufacturers were pioneers among Continental cotton industries in the adoption of innovations 
like indigo printing (1746) and engraved copper plates for printing (1770).
21 
    
The intermediate period (1780s-1833)
 22 
  The incorporation of the spinning process to the Catalan cotton industry characterized the 
second period of its development. Because for most of the eighteenth century all cotton yarn was 
imported (mainly from Malta), cotton spinning was of little importance in Catalonia. For example, 
the share of cotton yarn produced locally in 1784 was only of 22 percent whereas the remaining 88 
percent was imported from Malta (43 per cent) and other Mediterranean Ports. In 1784, two French 
machine-makers arrived in Barcelona bringing with them the technology of the spinning jenny. The 
adoption of the spinning jenny by local manufacturers was immediate.
23 Few years later, in 1792, an 
English engineer introduced an improved Highs jenny of 78 spindles (instead of the common 40 
spindles) and a new card machine. Arkwright water frame was to reach Catalonia soon after the 
Highs jenny.
24 In the next years, local machine-makers not only were able to produce copies of the 
original spinning jenny but also developed a large jenny with more spindles (sometimes it had up to 
                                                 
19 Thompson, “Technological Transfer”. 
20 There is a large debate on the role played by the colonial and home markets in the development of Catalan 
cotton industry. On this aspect see the review of the literature in Delgado, “Mercado interno”. 
21 Thompson, “Technological Transfer”. 
22 See on this period, Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”, “Indianeria catalana”, “Crisis económica” 
and Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation, “Technological Transfer”. 
23 Sánchez, "Crisis económica", pp. 495-496. 
24 Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation, p. 249-254.   5 
120), which received the name of bergadana.
25 By the end of the century (1796), there were 
reported to be 250 bergadanas in operation.
26  
  The successive wars and political disruptions made the progress of the industry during the 
first quarter of the nineteenth-century difficult. However, a further impulse to the local production 
of cotton yarn and cloth was given by the ban of foreign imports of cotton yarn in 1802 and the 
introduction of the mule-jennies from France in 1806. As happened previously with the spinning 
jenny and the water frame, these wood-made mule-jennies powered by water wheels or horses were 
rapidly copied by local machine-makers.
27 In the following years, two new major developments 
affected to the industry. On the one hand, several new cotton mills powered by water wheels or 
horses and equipped with  mule-jennies and water frames were established in Barcelona and other 
manufacturing towns. The growth in the use of hydraulic power caused a shift in the centre of the 
gravity of cotton spinning away from downtown Barcelona to the rivers banks in inner Catalonia.
28  
On the other hand, another part of the cotton spinning production was located at the remote villages 
and small towns of the Pre-Pyrenees and other isolated rural zones where they could rely upon a 
good supply of cheap domestic labour.
29 This was a typical cottage industry. The sub-contractor put 
out raw materials and semi-finished goods to a producer, who used its own tools, and also played, at 
least to some extent, a supervisory role of the final product. 
  Following the diffusion of cotton spinning away from Barcelona, handloom weavers 
proliferated across Catalonia.
30 Like in cotton spinning, diverse forms of organization prevailed in this 
industry. Handloom weaving in some districts was model example of independent artisan production 
whereas in others was the seat of domestic putting-out. In handloom weaving workshops, several 
                                                 
25 Ferrer Vidal, Conferencias, p. 101. 
26 Sánchez, "Crisis económica", p. 494 
27 Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”, p. 38; Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation, pp. 263-264. 
28 Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation, p. 261. 
29 Gutiérrez,  Impugnación, Sánchez,  “Era de la manufactura algodonera”, Thompson,  Distinctive 
Industrialisation, and García Balañà, Fabricació de la fàbrica. 
30 Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”.   6 
artisans with a few assistants, who were sometimes young members of his family, ran a small unit-of-
production with a limited division of labour. This artisan-organised production was the industrial 
structure of handloom weaving of the urban villages, suburbs and unincorporated towns in areas such 
as Reus and Barcelona. Instead, the organization of the domestic putting-out networks was in much the 
same way as did in cotton spinning. Consequently, although domestic producers used own looms, the 
sub-contractor put out yarn and played a supervisory role of the final product. 
  Contrary to cotton spinning and weaving, printing industry remained mainly located in 
Barcelona.
31 Moreover, this process was scarcely mechanised before the 1830s because few 
establishments adopted the new British and French machinery.
32 Typically, printing concerns ran like 
artisan workshops and, hence, the division-of-labour was scarce.  
 
The Revolutionary period (1833-1861)
33 
  The first steam-powered mill appeared in 1833 when the company “Bonaplata, Vilaregut, Rull 
and Cía.” began producing cloth made on power looms in Barcelona. In the 1830s, the diffusion of 
steam-power progressed slowly in Catalan cotton industry. By 1841, the power-steam was clearly the 
less important instrument of power: Of 2,014 HP employed in the Catalan mills in that year only 289, 
or 14 percent, was derived from steam.
34 The pace of technological change accelerated in the 1840s 
with the end of the Civil War in 1840 and the removal of British restrictions to machinery exports. By 
1850, the total HP employed in the industry had increased to 3,755 and the proportion attributable had 
soared to about 60 percent.
35 Eleven years later (1861), the total HP employed in the industry had 
increased to 5,800 and the proportion attributable to steam-power had also augmented to 67 percent.
36 
                                                 
31 Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation. 
32 On the mechanisation of calico printing see Nadal and Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals and Thompson, 
“Technological Transfer”. 
33 See a review of the literature on this period in Carreras, “Cataluña” and Nadal, “Indústria cotonera”. 
34 Sayró, Industria algodonera, and Madoz, Diccionario. 
35 Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas. 
36 Comisión especial arancelaria, Información.   7 
   In Catalonia, technological progress in cotton spinning paralleled the diffusion of steam-
power. Thus, from 1841 to 1850, the amount of hand spindles declined dramatically from 725,787 
to 180,058 whereas the number of mechanical  spindles grew from 316.320 to 524.178.
37 
Simultaneously, new iron-made mule-jennies and throstles replaced the old wood-made mule-
jennies and water frames. By 1861, the demise of hand spinning was complete since practically all 
cotton yarn was produced with modern steam or water-powered machinery.
38 Moreover, new self-
acting mules displaced mule-jennies from factories.  
Technological change was slower in weaving than in spinning. The persistence of handloom 
weaving can partly be explained by technological reasons. Although the first profitability power 
looms dated back 1813, they were best suited for weaving coarse cloth. In the 1840s and 1850s, the 
adoption of high-pressure steam engines, and the subsequent decrease in power costs, extended the 
range of cloth that could be produced efficiently with power-looms.
39 This signified the progressive 
retreat of handloom weaving, which survived in the fancy segments of the market. It is also 
important to note that power looms required high-strength yarn, which was more economically 
produced with throstles or self-acting mules. In Catalonia, the first power-looms were introduced in 
1828.
40 By 1841, however, the balance between handlooms and power-looms remained clearly 
favourable for the hand machinery.41 In effect, for each power-loom in use, it was more than 100 
handlooms. Ten years later (1850), the amount of power-looms had multiplied by twenty-five while 
the number of handlooms remained roughly the same.42 The demise of handloom weaving was 
apparent in 1861 given that the number of handlooms halved with respect to 1850 figures while the 
                                                 
37 The first figure is from Sayró, Industria algodonera and the second from Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, 
Censo de fabricas. 
38 Giménez Guited, Guia Fabril. 
39 See Von Tunzelmann,  Steam Power, chapter 7. Instead, Farnie,  English Cotton Industry and Lyons, 
“Powerloom Profitability” gave importance to the development of the Blackburn plain loom in 1841.  
40 Ferrer Vidal, Conferencias. 
41 Sayró, Industria algodonera and Madoz, Diccionario. 
42 Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas.   8 
number of power-looms multiplied by 1.7.43 Of the total cotton cloth wowed in that year in Catalonia 
only about one-fifth was made by hand-weavers.
44   
  Technological advance also modified  drastically cotton-finishing processes. In printing, 
hand processes with wooden blocks and copper plates being replaced by engraved copped rollers 
mechanically powered by mid-1780s. These new machinery increased dramatically the speed of 
printing and labour productivity. However, similar to weaving, block prints still had to be used in 
finishing patterns on fine goods after cylinders had printed most of the design. In Catalonia, the 
technological progress was exceptionally rapid in cotton printing during the 1840s and the 1850s. In 
1835, only four cylinder printing machines had been installed in Catalonia but by 1850 the number of 
active machines had soared to 41, arriving to 65 in 1861. The diffusion of the perrotine was even more 
impressive. The machine arrived from France only six years after its invention in 1840 and by 1861 
there were 43 in use.
45  
 
CHANGES IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
  The eighteenth-century calico printing industry was based on medium-large and centralised 
units-of-production although having several managerial structures, from capitalistic firms to artisans' 
co-operatives. The typical unit of production was formed by several work-teams, which were 
composed of several masters, artisans and apprentices, and labourers.
46 It was also integrated backward 
into cotton weaving and forward into marketing. The forward integration into marketing of calico 
producers was facilitated by the fact that many partners of the calico printing concerns were merchants. 
To distribute their products outside Catalonia, manufacturers organized a network of agents that were 
on charge of looking for buyers and received the fabrics on credit. For this reason, a considerable part 
of the capital of the calico concerns was commonly devoted to finance these marketing networks. 
                                                 
43 Giménez Guited, Guía Fabril. 
44 See appendix. 
45 Nadal, “Indústria cotonera”, pp. 34-37; and Nadal and Tafunell, Sant Martí de Provençals, pp. 39-50. 
46 Thompson , Distinctive Industrialisation and Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”.   9 
However, cotton concerns employed sometimes, particularly in overseas trade, alternative channels 
of distribution like cloth wholesalers, independent travellers and specialized merchant houses.
47 
  A movement towards specialization began in the early 1790s, with the spread of cotton 
spinning and weaving away from Barcelona.
48 So, the new cotton spinning mills were specialised and 
did not integrated forward into cotton weaving. Similarly, printing concerns abandoned backward 
integration into cotton weaving and, hence, employed the cloth made by independent handloom 
weavers. Therefore, it was common that spinning millowners and printing concerns relied on external 
contracts with the independent handloom weavers. 
  How these different types of specialized firms structured their business relations during the first 
four decades of the nineteenth century?
49 The precise relation between the interrelated sources of 
entrepreneurship and capital and the product strategies and the scale of firms during this period is 
difficult to determine. It was clear, however, that a complex interaction between different cotton textile 
producers and merchants was replicated throughout Catalonia.  Arrangements varied between typical 
business-relations, intermarriage and associated based kinship-based networks of partnerships, through 
to the more formal internalisation of activity. Although business organization was very far from 
impersonal atomistic competition, there could be no question of a single producer, or group, exerting 
overwhelming dominance. In any case, the cotton industry was organized hierarchically. On the top, an 
elite of businessmen with interests in several firms controlled large putting-out and subcontracting 
webs of small firms by offering to them credit, intermediate goods and marketing services. At the 
middle, a large number of small-medium textile producers were able to operate on the combination of 
credit from merchants and advances from other producers. The medium textile producers frequently 
rented space, and sometimes power, to the largest producers. Self-employed and domestic workers, 
                                                 
47 Thompson, Distinctive Industrialisation, pp. 87-88. 
48 Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”, pp. 93-99. 
49 This structure of the cotton industry was first described by Maluquer de Motes, “Estructura”. Recent 
detailed accounts are available in Solà Parera, Aigua and Garcia Balañá, Fabricació de la fàbrica. It is 
interesting to note the close parallelisms with Lancashire during the period. See, on Lancashire, Rose, Firms.   10 
who operated within the putting-out webs, occupied the lower ranks of the industry. This hierarchical 
structure served to the interests of the large businessmen and was adapted to the fluctuations in the 
demand for cotton goods, which were common in Spain due to the scarcity of the domestic market.
50 
Thus, at the peak of the business cycle capitalists increased the number of sub-contractors, whereas the 
contrary held in the trough years. 
 
TABLE 1 
THE DIFFUSION OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING, 
1850 AND 1861 
  1850  1861 
  Firms  %  Production  %  Firms  %  Production  % 
  A: Spinning 
Specialized  229  72.93  7,654  63.99  149  58.20  6,740  39.06 
Integrated  85  27.07  4,308  36.01  107  41.80  10,518  60.94 
Total  314  100.00  11,962  100.00  256  100.00  17,258  100.00 
  B: Weaving 
Specialized  891  91.29  5,779  55.69  411  79.34  5,039  33.01 
Integrated  85  8.71  4,598  44.31  107  20.66  10,225  66.99 
Total  976  100.00  10,377  100.00  518  100.00  15,264  100.00 
Notes: Some rounding. From the table it had been excluded firms with less than 10 workers. The production is 
expressed in Tons of yarn and cloth, respectively.  
Sources: The sources are Junta de Fabricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas for 1850 and Giménez Guited, Guia 
fabril for 1861. For the estimation of production and coverage of the sample see appendix. 
 
  Vertical integration of cotton spinning and weaving was scarce to the 1840s
51 but progressed 
dramatically in the following years (see table 1). According to the industrial survey for 1850,
52 vertical 
integration was rather common among cotton spinning: 229 firms with 9,389 spinners were devoted 
exclusively to cotton spinning, and 85 firms with 4,235 spinners had integrated vertically into cotton 
spinning and weaving. These firms also employed about half of the power installed and more than one 
third of mechanical spindles. Particularly relevant was their share in self-acting mules since they 
employed the 68 percent of that type of modern spinning machinery. In cotton weaving, the share of 
                                                 
50 On the domestic market for cotton goods see Prados, “Producción”. 
51 The first cotton spinning and weaving vertically integrated firms had appeared in the last years of the 
eighteenth century. See Sánchez, “Era de la manufactura algodonera”. 
52 See appendix for sources.   11 
vertically integrated firms was less than in cotton spinning due to the abundance of very small firms, 
all hand-powered, in that industry. However, like in cotton weaving, vertically integrated firms 
concentrated the most recent machinery. For example, more than the 83 percent of power-looms were 
installed in vertically integrated firms. For that reason, more than the 40 percent of cloth production 
was in hands of these firms, even though they employed only the 15 percent of weavers. 
  In the 1850s, the vertically integrated cotton mills continued their expansion capturing the 
market for medium-coarse cloth. However, well before the 1860s, some horizontal spinning mills and 
domestic hand-weavers survived by producing for more fashion-oriented segments of the market.
53 By 
1861, vertically integrated firms employed more than the 60 percent of spindles, more than the 80 
percent of power-looms and produced the 67 percent of cotton cloth.
54 Moreover, in eleven years the 
number of vertically integrated firms had increased by 25 percent while the number of specialized 
firms decreased by about 35 percent in cotton spinning and more than halved in weaving. 
  In comparison with England and France vertical integration was much more important in 
Catalonia.
55 English vertically integrated cotton mills employed the 52.9 percent of workers, the 63.9 
percent of power-looms and the 41.8 percent of mechanical spindles in 1861.
56 French vertically 
integrated cotton mills employed only the 3 percent of the cotton textiles workforce.
57 In a sharp 
contrast, in Catalonia the vertically integrated mills employed the 65.8 percent of workers, the 80.2 
percent of power-looms and the 55.2 percent of spindles.  
  The integration of cotton spinning and weaving with cotton printing was a comparative rarity. 
In 1850, only 4 of 57 firms devoted to printing also integrated vertically cotton weaving. These 
                                                 
53 Comisión especial arancelaria, Información. 
54 Gimenez Guited, Guia fabril. For the estimation of production see appendix. 
55 To correctly compare Catalonia and England it is necessary to convert the Catalan evidence to the British 
standards. For this reason, only power and water-driven factories with more than 10 workers were considered. 
Note also that the British sources do not report all labour because, for example, handloom weavers were not 
included. Gatrell, “Labour” offers a detailed description of British sources. 
56 Farnie, English Cotton Industry, p. 317. 
57 Sicsic, “Firm-size”, p. 459.   12 
vertically integrated firms had the 9 percent of workers and the 14 percent of steam-power employed in 
the cotton printing industry.
58 As in the integration of cotton spinning and weaving, the integration into 
cotton printing progressed during the 1850s although remained relatively scarce in comparison with 
cotton spinning and weaving. By 1861, 7 of 41 firms integrated the two consecutive phases and 




CHARACTERISTICS OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRMS 
  This section examines several major characteristics of vertically integrated firms in cotton 
spinning and weaving. First, it shows that vertically integrated firms predominated among the largest 
firms in cotton spinning and weaving. Second, it documents that this type of cotton firms tended to 
produce medium-coarse quality cloth. Third, it also establishes that vertically integrated cotton mills 
produced more products than specialized firms but in longer series. Finally, it points that the 
distribution of vertically integrated firms was not equal across all Catalan cotton textiles districts. 
  Vertically integrated firms predominated among the largest firms in both, cotton spinning and 
weaving (see the further table 2). In cotton spinning in 1850, only one-third of smallest firms 
(producing less of 50 Tons of yarn per year) were integrated vertically whereas this proportion grew to 
the 62 percent in the case of largest firms (producing more than 100 Tons of yarn per year). Similarly, 
in cotton weaving in 1850, only the 6 percent of firms producing less than 50 tons of cloth per year 
were vertically integrated whereas the share of this type of firms grew to 86 percent if one considers 
firms producing more than 100 tons of cloth per year.  
                                                 
58 Junta de Fábricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas. 
59 Giménez Guited, Guia Fabril.   13 
TABLE 2 
THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING FIRMS, 
1850 AND 1861 
      Spinning      Weaving   
  Firm Size  Small  Medium  Large  Small  Medium  Large 
  (Tm. year)  <50  50-100  >100  <50  50-100  >100 
    A: 1850 
Specialized  Firms   173  48  8  882  7  2 
 Production  3,399  3,155  1,100  4,943  444  392 
Integrated  Firms  56  16  13  59  14  12 
 Production  876  1,140  2,292  493  1,041  3,064 
Total  Firms  229  64  21  912  21  14 
 Production  4,274  4,295  3,392  5,436  1,485  3,456 
    B:1861 
Specialized  Firms   103  40  6  393  8  10 
 Production  2,640  3,113  987  3,028  582  1,429 
Integrated  Firms  50  28  29  56  18  33 
 Production  1,266  2,276  6,976  803  1,302  8,120 
Total  Firms  153  68  35  449  26  43 
 Production  3,907  5,389  7,963  3,831  1,884  9,550 
Notes and Sources: see table 1. 
 
  In eleven years, from 1850 to 1861, the average firm size grew considerably in cotton spinning 
and weaving. In cotton spinning, the average production per firm grew from 38 tons of yarn per year in 
1850 to 67 tons of yarn per year in 1861. Similarly, in cotton weaving, the average production per firm 
grew from 10.6 tons of cloth per year in 1850 to 29 tons of cloth per year in 1861. This growth of the 
average production was mainly due to the increasing share of the largest firms in total production. 
Simultaneously, the number of the largest vertically integrated firms grew considerably. In cotton 
spinning the number of the largest vertically integrated firms more than doubled from 1850 to 1861 
whereas in cotton weaving their number practically tripled between these same years.  
  Previous accounts of the cotton industries tend to stress that specialized and integrated firms 
differed in both, type of products and the degree of specialization. Vertically integrated firms in 
England and the United States tend to produce coarser cloth, and hence coarser yarn, than specialized 
firms.
60 On the other hand, specialised English spinners typically focused their production on a narrow 
range of counts while specialised weavers also concentrated in a relatively narrow range of cloths. 
                                                 
60 Temin, "Product Quality".   14 




THE RELATION BETWEEN TYPE OF FIRM AND CLOTH QUALITY, 1860 
  Coarse cloth  Medium cloth  Fine and Fancy cloth 
Type of firm  (counts below 20)  (counts 20-60)  (counts 60 or more) 
Weaving  2  2  14
Printing  2  12  6
Spinning and weaving  4  10  0
Spinning, weaving and printing  2  9  1
Notes: Some firms produced more than one quality of cloth. Coarse cloth: Curados, Cutíes, Driles, Empesas 
and Percalinas bastas. Medium cloth: Brillantinas, Elefantes, Empesas finas, Guineas, Hamburgos, Indianas 
normales, Madepolan, Muselinas, Panas, Percalinas, Retores, Ruanesas and Semi-retores. Fine cotton cloth and 
mixed fabrics: Batistas, Castores, Chalecos, Florentinas, Guatas, Indianas finas, Pañuelos, and Piqués.  
Sources:  The source of data on production is Orellana,  Exposición,
62 the classification of the quality of 
products is based on Ronquillo, Diccionario and the classification of firms is based on Gimenez Guited, Guia 
fabril.   
 
  As table 3 shows vertically integrated firms in Catalonia, regardless of they integrated vertically 
spinning and weaving or all three phases (spinning, weaving and printing), tended to produce medium-
coarse cloth. Instead, specialized weaving firms tended to produce fine and fancy cloth. Finally, cotton-
finishing firms produced all type of cotton goods since cloth quality depended on weaving firms. 
Commonly, these cotton-printing firms elaborated a reduced range of products and sometimes were 
sub-contracted by cotton weaving firms.  
  Like in Britain, vertically integrated cotton firms in Catalonia tended to elaborate a wider 
variety of products than specialised firms. Thus, weaving firms elaborated on average 1.4 different 
cloths (standard deviation of 0.79), printing firms elaborated on average 1.8 different fabrics (standard 
deviation of 1.05) and vertically integrated firms elaborated on average 3.5 different fabrics (standard 
deviation of 2.44). However, vertically integrated firms (larger than specialized firms) produced on 
                                                 
61 Brown, “Market Organization”. 
62 This book collects data on cotton firms that showed their products in an exposition on homage to the 
Queen during her visit to Barcelona. The sample of firms was of 54 (17 weaving firms, 14 printing firms and 
23 vertically integrated firms).   15 
average more quantity of each type of cloth than specialized firms.
63 In effect, the series of cloth 
produced by specialized firms were on average of 24 Tons (standard deviation of 19) whereas these 
series in integrated firms were on average of 109.5 tons (standard deviation of 40). Consequently, 
vertically integrated firms produced their standardized products (coarser cloth) on a larger scale than 
the specialized firms that produced finer and fancy cloths. Fine and fancy clothes were produced in 
small batches (to order), and require a shorter series than the coarser fabrics.       
 
FIGURE 1 
CATALONIA’S COTTON TEXTILE DISTRICTS 
 
  Figure 1 shows that Cotton production was relatively dispersed across Catalonia. To put an 
example, the distance between Barcelona and the capital of the second most important cotton district 
Igualada (Anoia) was about 40 miles by road. Power-based production was mainly based on the coastal 
districts whereas water-based production was located in the banks of the rivers in the districts of Anoia, 
Bages, Girona and North. Furthermore, there were remarkable differences in the distribution of the 
                                                 
63 The average amount of tons of cloth of each different series is obtained by dividing the total amount of 
cloth produced for firm in 1861 by the number of different cloths showed in the exposition.   16 
vertically integrated firms across cotton districts in Catalonia (see table 4) although this business 
organization progressed markedly from 1850 to 1861 in all districts (the only exception to this general 
rule was cotton spinning at the North district). 
TABLE 4 
THE SHARE (%) OF VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRMS IN THE DIFFERENT DISTRICTS 
1850 AND 1861 
  Spinning  Weaving 
Districts  1850  1861  1850  1861 
Anoia  11.23   56.09  28.70  67.01 
Bages  47.34   56.55  69.93  76.09 
Barcelona  31.81  66.40  40.84  62.56 
Garraf  100.00  100.00  100.00  99.78 
Girona  38.97  48.71  59.93  71.51 
Maresme  20.76  76.59  13.79  41.03 
North  35.67  26.49  13.77  57.80 
South  52.76  60.20  35.45  71.69 
Vallès  16.16  27.86  2.21  27.76 
Notes: The share of vertically integrated firms is computed as the ratio between the estimated production in Tons 
of yarn or cloth per year of vertically integrated firms and the estimated production in Tons of yarn or cloth per 
year of a given district. The actual countries (comarques) of Alt Penedés, Anoia, Baix Llobregat and Conca de 
Barberà formed the cotton district of Anoia; the county of Bages formed the cotton district of Bages; the county 
of Barcelonés formed the cotton district of Barcelona; the county of Garraf formed the cotton district of Garraf; 
the counties of Gironés, la Selva, Garrotxa and Pla de l’Estany formed the cotton district of Girona; the countiy 
of Maresme formed the district of Maresme; the counties of Cerdanya, Solsonés, Berguedà and Osona formed 
the North cotton district; the counties of Alt Camp, Baix Camp and Tarragones formed the South cotton district 
and, finally the counties of Vallès Occidental and Vallès Oriental formed the cotton district of Vallès. 
Sources: See table 1. 
 
EXPLAINING VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING 
  As a large literature emphasizes, vertical integration is a complex phenomenon that is the result 
of many causes, which can act alone or interact. Moreover, as Paul L. Joskow (“Vertical Integration”) 
has recently noted “there is not and will never be one unified theory of vertical integration”. However, 
the transaction cost theory of the firm is the most widely employed framework for the study of these 
institutional arrangements.
64  
                                                 
64 Alternative frameworks to transaction cost theory for the analysis of vertical integration comprise the 
neoclassical theories of vertical integration and the property rights approach, which had many similarities, 
but also some relevant differences, with the transaction cost approach. A good review of the different   17 
  Ronald Coase (“Nature”) was the first to argue that the firm integrates to avoid the costs of 
market exchange. Modern transaction cost-theory holds that these costs will be higher, the fewer the 
number of parties in the market and the more specialized the assets involved in the transaction, known 
as asset specificity.
 When exchange implies sizeable investments in relationship-specific capital, an 
exchange relationship that depends on repeat bargaining is unattractive. Investment in such assets 
exposes agents to a potential hazard since the lack of alternative uses raises the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour amongst contracting parties. If conditions vary, trading partners may try to expropriate the 
rents accruing to the specific assets. This is the so-called the “hold-up” problem.
65 Rents can be 
protected by means of vertical integration, where a merger eliminates any adversary interests, or by the 
use of contractual safeguards such as formalized long-term contracts and reputation.
66 As a rule non-
specific investment will result in market governance (subcontracting) while specific or idiosyncratic 
investment and recurrent transacting will result in firm governance (vertical integration). All in all, 
when a firm invests in assets that have a high degree of asset specificity it tend to integrate into the next 
phase in order to avoid opportunism in their transactions with other firms. Oliver E. Williamson 
(Mechanisms of Governance) identifies up to five different situations in which asset specificity is 
thought to arise: physical asset specificity, dedicated assets, site specificity, human asset specificity and 
intangible assets. The first three are the most pertinent in order to explain the vertical integration of 
cotton spinning and weaving. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
approaches is Joskow “Vertical Integration”. See, also, Shelanski and Klein, “Empirical Research” and Klein 
“Make-or-buy Decision” for the empirical literature. 
65 Williamson, Markets, Economic Institutions, Mechanisms of Governance, Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
“Vertical Integration” and Grossman and Hart, “Costs”. 
66 In the case of the Spanish early cotton industry reputation matters little since firms were commonly new 
and the survival rate was very low. Similarly, contracts were difficult to enforce because the performance of 
Spanish trials and the changing political situation.   18 
  To analyse the issue of the determinants of the decision of vertically integrate cotton spinning 
and weaving, this section follows the standard empirical strategy of the transaction cost literature.
67 
Vertical integration is seen as a function of a certain asset specificity properties of the underlying 
transaction. Given that asset specificities (or transaction costs) are not directly observable (and difficult 
to measure), several of the typical proxies for asset specificity like market concentration, production 
capacity, and type of technology are used.   
  Two alternative definitions of the dependent variable, vertical integration of cotton spinning 
and weaving production, are employed in this article although the same set of independent variables is 
considered to explain them. The first treats vertical integration as a dummy variable, where a cotton 
firm is vertically integrated if it is in possession of machinery of the two production phases. The 
second approach treats vertical integration as a limited dependent variable, measured by the ratio of 
cloth production capacity to yarn production capacity in the case of cotton spinning, and the inverse in 
the case of cotton weaving. A ratio of one is assumed to indicate self-sufficiency. In the case of cotton 
spinning, a ratio of less than one suggests market transaction to sell excess yarn (for example, if the 
value is zero this indicates that the firm put all its yarn into market transactions). Similarly, in the case 
of cotton weaving, a ratio of less than one suggests market transactions to supplement the production 
of cloth.   
  Market concentration serves as a proxy for the potential for a small-numbers bargaining 
problem since suggests the amount of alternative suppliers (or buyers) that firms may turn to in the 
event of the opportunistic behaviour by another party.
68 Then, high concentration could be associated 
                                                 
67 See Klein, “Make-or-buy Decision” for a detailed analysis of the strategies for empirical research in 
transaction-cost economics. 
68 Ohanian (“Vertical Integration”) suggest this test for transaction cost theory. It should be noted, however, 
that the high market concentration indicator is also consistent with monopoly (monopsody) power 
explanations for vertical integration. Moreover, transaction-cost and market-power based theories of vertical 
integration are difficult to distinguish, empirically, since each makes similar predictions (see, MacDonald, 
“market Exchange”). However, the objective of this paper is not to test the superiority of one over the other 
but to present an explanation for vertical integration in cotton industry. And what it is clear from the results   19 
with situations where there is greater possibility for “hold-up” problems and a greater incentive to 
vertically integrate. In the case of high concentration ratios dedicated  assets and site specificity 
problems may appear. On the one hand, dedicated assets problems arises when a supplier make an 
investment that would not otherwise be made but for the expectation of selling a substantial amount to 
a particular buyer/s. If that  relationship terminated suddenly, it would leave the supplier with 
significant excess of capacity.  There is a “buyer” side analogy to the supplier dedicated asset history as 
well.
69 A buyer that relies in a single (or few) supplier(s) for a large volume of an input may find it 
difficult and costly to replace immediately these supplies if they are terminated prematurely. 
Consequently, to set a cotton-spinning firm in a certain location would be very risky if the firm had not 
found enough demand, and different demanders, for the quantity of yarn of a certain count (quality) 
that it was capable to put into the market. Due to this, it could be interesting for firms entering into 
certain locations with few buyers of their yarn integrate into the next phase instead to grow 
horizontally by acquiring more firms in the same phase. An analogous problem, but on the buyer side, 
arise with cotton weaving firms. Therefore, if a cotton-weaving firm enter in a particular market with a 
small number of yarn producers, it could suffer “hold-up” problems from their suppliers. On the other 
hand, site specificity arises when successive stages are located in close proximity to one another, 
reflecting previous decisions to minimize inventory and transport expenses. Once sited the assets in 
question, the set-up and/or reallocation costs are high. Catalan cotton industry was relatively dispersed 
in many districts (see graph 1 and table 4). More prominently, many mills were water-powered and 
were located in the countryside relatively isolated from suppliers and/or buyers. Even many steam-
powered mills were located in districts where the number of alternative supplier and/or buyers was 
relatively small. Consequently, given that reallocation costs were high it is likely that mills in districts 
with high concentration ratios tend to integrate vertically cotton spinning and weaving. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
is that high buyer and seller concentration ratios were closely related with vertical integration. Therefore, I 
do not reject an alternative interpretation based on market power although it seems less plausible within the 
Spanish historical context given the behaviour of prices in cotton yarn, grey cloth and printed cloth. 
69 Joskow, “Contract Duration”.   20 
  The decision to integrate and the extent of vertical integration are hypothesized to be a positive 
function of firm size, because the transaction-cost-savings would be greater in larger firms compared to 
smaller firms (all else equal). There are several reasons for this. First, larger firms suffered more 
dedicated asset problems than smaller firms because the costs of a supply (demand) disruption would 
be greater than for a smaller firms.
70 Second, if the frequency of transaction rises with firm size, a 
greater frequency of transactions will increase the gains arising from integration and may justify the 
costs of internal organization.
 71 Third, the presence of imperfections in capital markets can give an 
incentive to vertical integration of larger firms. Vertical integration works as an internal capital market 
and, therefore, it represents the elimination of financial intermediaries.
72 In other words, the absence of 
external financing can give an incentive to firms to buy the next phase and to employ their money 
invested in circulating capital (i.e., the money used for credit to customers) within the firm. In Spain, 
the small size of the market and its unstable character caused difficulties for financial institutions trying 
to develop an impersonal system of money lending.
73 Thus, the Catalan cotton firms used an important 
part of their resources financing their own customers since credits from banks and other financial 
intermediaries were scarce. It was rare that wholesalers or shops paid in advance or amortised their 
debts over short periods. Similarly, small firms could not easily borrow money or discount bills-of-
exchange in banks. For this reason, it was common for larger firms to finance smaller industrial firms. 
Consequently, for large cotton firms it could be very convenient to integrate backward (or forward) 
because they already indirectly financed this phase and convert the circulating capital lent to other 
companies into fixed capital, which was directly owned by the company.   
  Finally, I hypothesize a positive relation between modern machinery and vertical integration. 
Physical assets and dedicated assets specificity can account for this situation. Physical asset specificity 
                                                 
70 Temin (“Product Quality”, p, 902) raised a similar point. 
71 Instead, other authors hypothesised a negative relation between firm size and the probability of integration due 
to managerial diseconomies of scale. For a full discussion of the managerial problems and advantages of 
vertical integration see Williamson, Economic Institutions, chapter 6. 
72 Williamson , Markets and Mowery, “Finance”. 
73 Graell, Informació pública.   21 
problems arise when firms make investments in equipment and machinery with design characteristics 
specific to the transaction and, hence, lower values in alternative uses. Several technical characteristics 
of the machinery available in the cotton industry during the second third of the nineteenth century 
could generate this kind of problems. First, the self-acting mule in cotton spinning and the power-loom 
in cotton weaving were only suitable for the medium and coarse qualities. Second, as it  has been 
shown previously, they produced longer series than other types of machinery; consequently, they also 
incur in dedicated assets problems. The old technologies, mule-jennies and handlooms, were more 
efficient in the elaboration of fine cloth and mixed-fabrics and could produce in small batches (to 
order).
74 Third, power-looms required very homogeneous high-strength yarn to avoid recurrent 
breakouts during the weaving process. Only self-acting mules and throstles were capable to produce 
the required amount of homogeneous high-strength yarn since mule-jennies and hand-spindles were 
unable to do so.
75 Power-loom weaving firms could not know ex-ante this quality of the yarn. In effect, 
when yarn was placed in power-looms one could discover by the frequency of breakouts if conforms 
the strength requirements. Moreover, the marginal value of this high-strength yarn was nothing for 
handloom weavers since they could employ all types of yarn without additional costs.
76 Consequently, 
theory predicts that firms employing self-acting mules or/and power-looms (modern machinery) tend 
to integrate vertically cotton spinning and weaving more frequently than firms employing mule-jennies 
or handlooms. 
                                                 
74 The Spanish contemporary technical handbooks refer to these problems with the self-acting mule and the 
advantages of maintaining the use of mule-jennies. See, for example, Arau, Tratado completo. However, the 
self-acting mule was more flexible than the throstle as the latter efficiently produced only a very limited 
range of counts in larger series. See, also, Von Tunzelmann,  Steam Power and Lyons, “Powerloom 
Profitability”. 
75 Von Tunzelmann, Steam Power and Lyons, “Powerloom Profitability”. 
76 This problem could be solved if Catalan weaving firms established long-term contracts with their yarn 
suppliers or a system of reputation based on trademarks. However, during this period, the firms lasted short 
periods (typically five years or less) and contracts were hard to enforce given the well-known inefficiency of 
the Spanish legal system. Moreover, Spanish patent law did not protect trademarks and quality 
improvements from imitations.   22 
  These arguments can be formalized into the following pair of equations: 
(1) Vertical Integration (PROB=1) = F (Concentration, Size, Modern Machinery), 
(2) Cloth (yarn) production / Yarn (cloth) production = F (Concentration, Size, Modern Machinery). 
   
  The equation (1) can be estimated by a logit regression (the dependent variable takes the value 
1 if vertical integration is positive). In the equation (2), because the dependent variable is limited 
between zero (market transaction) and one (self-sufficiency), this model should be estimated by a Tobit 
regression. 
  However, with these two different methods of regression, one cannot control for the 
unobservable heterogeneity. For example, some firms would like to integrate vertically upward (or 
downward) but had not access to necessary funds or their managers were unable to manage an upward 
(downward) phase. If one assumes that this unobservable heterogeneity is a firm-specific component, 
this can be addressed by using panel data techniques given that we had observations for two different 
periods (1850 and 1861).
77 In this case, one has two alternative models: fixed and random effects. If 
individual effects and regressors are correlated, the choice should be a fixed-effects model. Instead, if 
regressors and individual effects are orthogonal, one should employ the random-effects model.
78 The 
Hausman (“Specification Tests”) test shows that the random-effect model is more efficient than the 
fixed-effects model but both models do not differ systematically. In this case, the standard solution is to 
investigate directly the correlation between individual effects and regressors. The results obtained in 
these tests lead us to accept the null hypothesis of non-correlation in all the models estimated, at any 
significance level. Hence, the choice has been to estimate a random-effects logit model for equation 1 
and the random-effects Tobit model for equation 2. 
                                                 
77 Panel data methods were employed for first time to analyse vertical integration in González-Díaz, 
Arruñada and Fernández, “Causes of Subcontracting”. Basically, this article applies their methodology. 
78 To analyse this issue this article follows the standard procedure described in Greene, Econometric Analysis, 
pp. 479-480.   23 
TABLE 5  
DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING 
Dependent 
 Variable 
Vertical integration = 1; 
 0 otherwise 
Cloth (yarn) production / 











  A: Only spinning 
Constant  -1.6683
a   -2.8520
a    -2.9480
a    -2.8878
 a 
  (0.2830)  (0.8752)  (0.4157)  (0.4532) 
Concentration  0.0299
a   0.0512
a   0.0255
 a    0.0294
a 
  (0.0074)  (0.0179)  (0.0067)  (0.0065) 
Size  0.0126
a    0.0195
a    0.0077
a    0.0096
a 
  (0.0025)  (0.0060)  (0.0015)  (0.0017) 
Modern Machinery  0.0076
a    0.0123
b   0.0087
a    0.0093
a 
  (0.0024)  (0.0049)  (0.0027)  (0.0019) 
Log likelihood  -358.8458  -355.7697  -422.6898  -467.3471 
Chi
2  60.85  12.41  94.40  54.67 
Pseudo R
2  0.0782  n.a.  0.1005  n.a. 
Observations  608  608  608  608 
  B : Only weaving 
Constant  -3.7067
a    -3.8446
a    -4.7907
a    -4.7845
a   
  (0.3070)  (0.3135)  (0.6034)  (0.6030) 
Concentration  0.0225
a    0.0232
a    0.0299
a  0.0298
a    
  (0.0078)  (0.0080)    (0.0076)  (0.0076) 
Size  0.0063
b    0.0064
b    -0.0004
d    -0.0004
d   
  (0.0028)  (0.0029)  (0.0012)  (0.0013) 
Modern Machinery  0.0328
a    0.0342
a   0.0420
a    0.0419
a   
  (0.0030)  (0.0031)  (0.0051)  (0.0051) 
Log likelihood  -350.7424  -349.5236  -468.7724  -468.7241 
Chi
2  391.01  287.70  337.81  79.90 
Pseudo R
2  0.3579  n.a.  0.2639  n.a. 
Observations  1472  1472  1472  1472 
Notes:  Standard errors are in brackets. Yearly dummies are included in all regressions. The concentration 
variable is a geometric average of the concentration ratios in cotton spinning sector and cotton weaving in a 
given district. This follows Caves and Bradburd (“Empirical Determinants”) that recommended estimating 
joint seller and buyer market concentration in each market. These concentration ratios are obtained as the ratio 
between the (estimated) production capacity of the largest four firms of that district and the total (estimated) 
production capacity of that district.
79 Size is measured as the production capacity in tons (of yarn or cloth) per 
year. Modern machinery is measured as the ratio of the estimated production made by steam and water-powered 
machinery to the total estimated production of the firm. 
a indicates significant at 0.01 level; 
b indicates significant 
at 0.05 level; 
c indicates significant at 0.1 level; 
d indicates no significant. 
                                                 
79 I also tested alternative measures of concentration like the total amount of production capacity of the 
district, the total production capacity of yarn or cloth, and the concentration ratio of the upward (backward) 
sector without significantly different results in the regressions. All these alternative estimations are available 
under request from the author.   24 
Sources: See table 1. 
 
  The table 5 presents a variety of estimation results. They are broadly consistent each other, 
suggesting that the results are robust to regression specification. The explanatory variables worked 
reasonably well doing their work explaining vertical integration. More prominently, all the 
coefficients are of the expected sign and, practically in all occasions significant. However, some 
differences among the different estimations are remarkable. Particularly, the different specifications 
explain better vertical integration in cotton weaving than spinning. This is mainly due to the high 
significance of the variable “machinery” in cotton weaving indicating that physical asset specificity 
was very important in the case of the adoption of power-looms. Therefore, it is likely that vertical 
integration advanced as a backward integration of power-loom weaving into mechanical spinning.  
TABLE 6 
DETERMINANTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN COTTON SPINNING AND WEAVING: 
ENTRANTS VERSUS ESTABLISHED FIRMS 
Sample  Entrants  Established  
Method  Logit  Tobit  Logit  Tobit 
Constant  -3.7842
a    -4.4843
a  -5.1539
a    -2.8647
a  




c     0.0097
d    




b    0.0024
d   
     (0.0024)    (0.0014)  (0.0074)  (0.0022) 
Modern Machinery  0.0193
a  0.0269
a  0.0288
a    0.0239
a   
     (0.0027)     (0 .0039)  (0.0099)  (0.0072) 
Log likelihood  -277.2565  -389.8194  -60.7414  -91.4793 
Chi
2  193.07  161.66  57.20  47.30 
Pseudo R
2  0.2612  0.1717  0.3201  0.2054 
Observations  637  637  140  140 
Notes: Standard errors are in brackets. All estimations comprise observations in cotton spinning and weaving 
(sector dummies are included in the regressions). The dependent variable in logit estimations is Vertical 
integration = 1, 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Tobit regressions is Cloth (yarn) production /Yarn 
(cloth) production. 
a indicates significant at 0.01 level; 
b indicates significant at 0.05 level; 
c indicates significant 
at 0.1 level; 
d indicates no significant. See table 5. 
Sources: See table 1. 
 
  It is also interesting to explore whether integration behaviour of entering cotton firms differed 
from established firms. The period of entry was eleven years (from 1850 to 1861). Table 6 presents   25 
the results of an analysis of the probability to integrate and the extent of internal markets separately 
for firms that were new in the sample year of 1861 and for established firms that had been operating 
in the previous sample year.
80 The models are the same than those estimated in table 5, and were 
estimated only for firms operating in 1861. 
  It is remarkable that the regression coefficients in both logit and Tobit estimations suggest that 
established cotton firms were less reactive to the transaction-cost variable, the concentration ratio, 
comparing to entering firms. This implies that once a firm was established as integrated or specialized, 
few firms changed of business structure. Over the period 1850-1861, only 15 of 118 firms chose to 
switch, most by eliminating or purchasing a mill. As a result, most established firms did not adapt to 
changes in the determinants of vertical integration over time. In other words, the rapid increase in the 
share of vertically integrated firms occurred through the large amount of entry and exit of firms during 
the period. Given that the concentration ratios in each district grew over the period
81 as a consequence 
of the increase in the average firm size, entrants to each district were more likely to be integrated over 
time. The large coefficient for the concentration for entrants compared to established firms is consistent 
with their response to the increase in district concentration, and the results for the entry variable also 
point a stronger role for transaction-cost factors among entrants than established firms. 
 
EXPLAINING VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION IN COTTON PRINTING AND MARKETING 
  The objective of this section is to apply the intuitions behind the model outline above to other 
phases in the production and distribution of cotton textiles. More specifically, it will speculate about 
                                                 
80 Ohanian (“Vertical Integration”) suggested this test. 
81 More specifically, in 1850 the concentration ratios (measured as the average of the ratios of the four 
largest firms in cotton spinning and weaving) were the following: Anoia (26.30 p ercent), Bages (32.99 
percent), Barcelonès (23.80 percent), Garraf (89.61 percent), Gironés (71.46 percent), Maresme (23.35 
percent), Osona 21.56 (percent), Tarragona (53.28 percent) and Vallès (34.54 percent). Instead, in 1861, they 
were: Anoia (37.37 percent), Bages (32.65 percent), Barcelonès (37.48 percent), Garraf (81.80 percent), 
Gironés (81.72 percent), Maresme (43.14 percent), Osona (43.65 percent), Tarragona (56.89 percent) and 
Vallès (36.97 percent).   26 
the relevance of the dependent variables (concentration, size and modern machinery) in explaining the 
limited scope of vertical integration in cotton-printing, raw cotton markets, and finished cloth markets.  
  Why vertical integration was so limited in cotton printing? Interestingly, the cotton printing 
firms in Catalonia shared several of the characteristics of vertically integrated firms in cotton spinning 
and weaving but also differed in others prominently.  
  Size and the production of longer series were characteristics shared by printing and vertically 
integrated cotton and weaving firms. The average production capacity of cotton-printing firms was of 
131 Tons in 1850 and of 223 Tons in 1861; that is, several times the average capacity of cotton 
spinning and weaving firms. Moreover, the ten largest firms in cotton printing had more production 
capacity (measured in Tons) than the ten largest firms in cotton spinning or weaving. Consequently, at 
first sight, their size may justify the costs of internal organization and made desirable backward vertical 
integration of cotton-printing firms into cotton weaving. However, the extent of vertical integration 
among these largest cotton-printing firms was limited; so, in 1861, only 3 of 10 integrated vertically 
cotton printing with cotton weaving.
82 Moreover, like in cotton spinning and weaving, modern printing 
firms produced long series of each type of cloth than traditional firms; therefore, apparently, they could 
incur in dedicated assets problems.  
  However, printing firms also differed prominently in other characteristics. First, they did not 
suffer the physical asset problems of power-loom weaving firms since modern printing machinery 
could use any kind of cotton cloth regardless their quality, which was easiest measured for any 
expert.
83 Second, in spite that the overall (region-wide) concentration of the cotton-printing phase was 
the highest,
84 the concentration level of the firms by district was relatively low. Catalan cotton-printing 
firms were concentrated in only two locations: the majority of firms were located in Barcelona 
(particularly, at the borough of Sant Martí de Provençals) and the remaining at the Anoia cotton district 
                                                 
82 Similarly, of the ten largest cotton-weaving firms only three integrated forward into cotton printing. 
83 Comisión especial arancelaria, Información. 
84 This was mainly due to the fact that the number of firms was much less than in the other phases.   27 
(mainly in the town of Igualada).
85 In other words, weaving firms did not experienced small-numbers 
bargaining problems when sold their grey cloth to printing firms or when subcontracted printing 
processes. Moreover, given the structure of the distribution of cloth in Catalonia, printing firms also not 
suffer that kind of problems. Cotton cloth was produced elsewhere in Catalonia but was habitually 
transported to Barcelona for their distribution; so the majority of cotton-weaving firms had a 
storehouse in the city. In other words, the supply of grey cloth in Barcelona was continuous exceeding 
by large the production capacity of the city and its surroundings. In sum, the preponderance of 
specialized firms in cotton printing can be explained by appealing to the little importance of asset 
specificity in printing production.
86     
  It is remarkable to note that similar arguments can be used to explain the low levels of 
backward integration of cotton firms into the supply of raw cotton and forward integration into the 
distribution of finished cloth. In the first case, the quality of raw cotton was easy to recognize for any 
expert since depend on the physical, and observable, characteristics of the fibre. Moreover, in 
Barcelona were located a sizeable amount of wholesale merchants that were capable of maintain a 
continuous flow of raw cotton at competitive prices. For example, the largest individual consumer of 
raw cotton in Catalonia, the “España Industrial SA”, chartered ships with raw cotton from New 
Orleans in the late 1850s but decided to abandon this type of business rapidly because did not obtain 
any savings at all.
87  
  In the case of finished fabrics marketing, a large number of wholesalers, merchants and agents 
devoted to trade with cotton goods were also located in Barcelona. Commonly, these merchants carried 
with all the distribution of Catalan cloth through Spain although they sometimes received credit from 
cotton industry firms. Therefore, for any cotton firm was relatively easy to change of merchant; in 
                                                 
85 For example, by 1850, 49 of 57 printing firms were located at the District of Barcelona and in 1861 this 
proportion grew since 37 of 42 were located there. 
86 It should be noted that had been estimated regressions similar to those of table 5 employing cotton-
finishing data without any significant result. 
87 See on this market, Castañeda and Tafunell, “Mercado mayorista”.   28 
other words, the small-number bargaining problem was of little importance in the distribution of 
finished cloth. More prominently, it was common for the largest cotton industry firms to maintain 
commercial relations with a large number of merchant-houses (sometimes more than fifty).
88  
 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
  This article offers new insights into the causes of vertical integration, and subcontracting, in 
Spanish cotton industry by applying some of the arguments of the transaction cost theory. The use of 
vertical integration was more widespread in yarn markets characterized by relatively high buyer and 
seller concentration. New entrants especially shown to be sensitive to the transaction-cost factors, 
measured by district concentration, compared to the established firms. Larger cotton spinning and 
weaving firms and those employing the most recent technology (self-acting mules and power-looms) 
were also more likely to vertically integrate due to physical and dedicated assets problems. Instead, 
subcontracting predominated in those phases, like cotton printing and the marketing of raw cotton and 
finished cotton goods, where small-numbers bargaining problems were minor and where asset 
specificity problems were less important. Consequently, vertical integration was not caused by any 
broad characteristic of the Spanish market for cotton goods but for some particular characteristics of 
the intermediate markets for yarn.
89 
  These results suggest the appeal of some sort of evolutionary interpretation of the changes in 
the market structure of the cotton industry in Catalonia over the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries 
in the line of the life-cycle theory advanced by George J. Stigler (“Division of Labor”). At the 
beginnings, the predominance of vertical integration into weaving and marketing among calico printing 
concerns was probably caused by the small-numbers bargaining problem. Therefore, there were not 
                                                 
88 See Prat and Soler, “Formación de redes comerciales”. 
89 Note that this result contradicts previous research (Maluquer, “Estructura”) that stressed that, given the 
characteristics of the Spanish home market (small and unstable), the only choice for Catalan cotton firms was 
subcontracting.   29 
enough independent handloom weavers
90 and merchants to satisfy the buyer and seller necessities of 
the relatively large printing concerns. The reliance of cotton firms in vertical integration decreased 
since the 1790s onwards. It is likely that the industry grew enough to maintain specialized firms in 
both, cotton weaving and printing. Simultaneously, the new cotton spinning industry was vertically 
specialized because was formed by relative small units of production. Moreover, cotton industry 
machinery allowed producing in small batches (to order). In other words, asset specificity problems 
(particularly physical assets and dedicated assets) appear to be minor during this period. Moreover, 
given the high levels of uncertainty and the low levels of asset specificity, vertical specialization was 
efficient to cope with the unstable demand given the low contracting costs.
91 The situation changed 
dramatically with the arrival of the factory system and the new self-acting mules, throstles and power-
looms. These new technologies were less flexible than the older machinery and produced longer series 
of each type of yarn and cloth; then, cotton mills grew on size and put pressure on local markets for 
yarn.  For this reason, dedicated, physical and site specificity problems arise and new entrants in cotton 
spinning and weaving decided to integrate vertically these two consecutive phases. It is likely that this 
situation was maintained over the rest of the century given that the average mean size grew, the 
industry remained dispersed in many locations due to the increase in the number of watermills, and the 
high survival rates of established cotton firms, which were reluctant to change of business 
organization. 
  How these results for Spain compare with previous studies for other countries? It is clear that 
Spanish experience has some important resemblances with the experience of other countries and this 
                                                 
90 Thompson (Distinctive Industrialisation) underlines that the absolute preponderance of the guild system in 
Barcelona, which limited the extent of the market, had made the organization of the weaving industry in a 
putting-out basis virtually impossible. 
91 The literature on transaction costs argue that uncertainty is relevant for vertical integration if a certain degree 
of asset specificity exists. If a transaction does not require specific investments, contracting costs are small and a 
new agreement could be easily reached in any new situation. Instead, when asset specificity exists, uncertainty 
increases the cost of establishing how the participants should act in each possible contingency and makes 
possible the existence of unforeseen hold-up problems. See on this point, for example, Williamson, Economic 
Institutions.   30 
research may serve to throw light in some obscure issues. Previous studies on the cotton industries in 
Lancashire, the United States and Germany have found that size, product type (coarse goods) and 
localization were major determinants of vertical integration of cotton spinning and weaving.
92 It 
appears that a universal pattern is that bigger spinning and weaving firms had a major tendency to 
vertically integrate than smaller firms. Product type is directly related to the choice of technology given 
that some technologies (like the self-acting mule and the power-looms) were more adapted to the 
production of coarser than finer goods. Consequently, the variable machinery of this study can be 
considered practically equivalent to the variable quality of these studies. In other words, it also seems 
that certain technologies, which were employed to produce coarse goods, had more predisposition to 
vertical integration given their asset specificity problems. In spite of all these studies have considered 
the relative importance of the location variables, they have rarely linked this relevance to the presence 
of small-number bargaining problems.
93 This study offers a  straightforward explanation for the 
relevance of location in the choice between vertical integration and market governance. Districts with 
high concentration ratios suffered from small-numbers bargaining problems and, hence, had a large 
share of vertically integrated firms. This argument could be employed to explain why English cotton 
industry was vertically specialized and the U.S. and the German cotton industries were vertically 
integrated. In Lancashire, the concentration of cotton firms of different phases in a short distance was 
extraordinary. Instead, cotton firms in Spain, the United States and Germany were sometimes 
dispersed or even isolated from other firms. Consequently, it is not strange that they suffered from 
small-numbers bargaining problems a nd face large transaction and transport cost when change of 
supplier or buyer. 
  Finally, I would like to highlight three broad suggestions for further research. First, the 
evidence in this paper points to the importance of high concentration ratios and the subsequent small-
                                                 
92 Huberman “Vertical Disintegration”, Temin, “Product Quality” and Brown, “Market Organization”. 
93 A notable exception to this rule is the article of Leunig (“New Answers”) on Lancashire cotton industry 
during the early twenty century. He argues that spinning firms did not suffered hold-ups because, given the high 
spatial concentration of the industry, it was enough downstream competition.    31 
numbers bargaining problems in the firms’ choice of vertical integration. Consequently, it would be 
desirable to extent the evidence on market concentration to cotton industries in other countries. Second, 
the article’s findings suggest the need for rethinking the relationship between vertical integration and 
international competitiveness. In the line of the previous study of John C. Brown (“Market 
Organization”) on Germany, the results obtained here supports the view that there was not close 
connexion between vertical integration and a successful position in international markets for cotton 
goods. Third, from the point of view of the economic theory, this article has shown the explanatory 
power of the transaction cost theory in economic and business history. 








Arau, Narciso. Tratado completo de la hilatura del algodón. Barcelona: Imprenta Luis Tasso, 1855. 
 
Brown, John C. "Market Organization, Protection, and Vertical Integration: German Cotton Textiles before 
1914", Journal of Economic History 52, no. 2 (1992): 339-351. 
 
Carreras, Albert. "Cataluña, primera región industrial de España". In Pautas regionales de la industrialización 
española (siglos XIX-XX) edited by Jordi Nadal and  Albert Carreras, pp. 259-295. Barcelona: Ariel, 1990. 
 
Castañeda, Lluís and Xavier Tafunell. “El mercado mayorista del algodón en Barcelona a mediados del siglo 
XIX”. In Doctor Jordi Nadal. La Industrialització i el Desenvolupament Econòmic d’Espanya edited by Albert 
Carreras, Jordi Pascual, David Reher and Carles Sudrià, vol. 2., pp. 990-1005.  Barcelona: Publicacions 
Universitat de Barcelona, 1999. 
 
Caves, Richard E. and Ralph M. Bradburd. “The Empirical Determinants of Vertical Integration”. Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization 9 (1988): 265-279. 
 
Clark, Gregory. "Why Isn't the Whole World Developed? Lessons from the Cotton Mills". Journal of Economic 
History 47, no. 1(1987): 141-173. 
 
Coase, Ronald H. "The Nature of the Firm." Economica 4 (1937): 33-55. 
 
Comisión Especial Arancelaria. Información sobre el derecho diferencial de bandera y sobre los de aduanas 
exigibles a los hierros, al carbón de piedra y los algodones, presentada al gobierno de Su Majestad por la 
comisión nombrada de efecto en Real Decreto de 10 de noviembre de 1865. Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1867. 
 
Delgado, Josep M. "Mercado interno versus mercado colonial en la primera industrialización española". Revista 
de Historia Económica 13, no. 1 (1995): 11-31. 
 
Farnie, Douglas A. The English Cotton Industry and the World Market, 1815-1896. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979.   32 
 
Ferrer Vidal, José. Conferencias sobre el arte de hilar y tejer en general y especialmente  sobre el de hilar y 
tejer el algodón. Barcelona: Establecimiento de Jaime Jepús Roviralta, 1875. 
 




García Balañà, Albert. La fabricació de la fàbrica. Treball i política a la Catalunya cotonera (1784-1874): 
Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat. 
 
Gatrell, V.A.C. "Labour, Power, and the Size of Firms in Lancashire Cotton in the Second Quarter of the 
Nineteenth Century". Economic History Review 30, no 1 (1977): 95-139. 
 
Gimenez Guited, Francisco.  Guia fabril e industrial de España. publicada con el apoyo y autorización del 
gobierno de S.M. Madrid and Barcelona: Librería Española and Librería del Plus Ultra, 1862. 
 
González-Díaz, Manuel, Benito Arruñada and Alberto Fernández, “Causes of subcontracting: evidence from 
panel data on construction firms”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 42 (2000): 167-187.  
 
Graell, Guillem.  Informació pública sobre la necessitat de crear una banca catalana. Barcelona: Societat 
d'Estudis Económics, 1908. 
 
Greene, W. H. Econometric Analysis. New York: Mac Millan, 1993.  
 
Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. “The Costs and benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration”. Journal of Political Economy 94 (1986): 691-719. 
 
Gutiérrez, Manuel M.. Impugnación a las cinco proposiciones de Pebrer sobre los grandes males que causa la 
ley de aranceles a la nación en general. a la Cataluña en particular, y a las mismas fábricas catalanas. Madrid: 
Imprenta de M. Calero, 1837. 
 
Hausman, J. “Specification Tests in Econometrics”. Econometrica 46 (1978): 1251-1271.  
 
Huberman, Michael. “Vertical Disintegration in Lancashire: A comment on Temin”. Journal of Economic 
History 50, no. 3 (1990): 683-690.   
 
Jeremy, David J. “Organization and Management in the Global Cotton Industry, 1800s-1990s”. In The Fibre that 
Changed the World. The Cotton Industry in International Perspective, 1600-1990s, edited by Douglas A. Farnie 
and David J. Jeremy, pp. 191-245. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
 
Joskow, Paul L. “Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal 
markets”. American Economic Review 77, no. 1 (1987): 168-185. 
 
———. "Vertical Integration". In Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Menard and 
Mary Shirley, Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2005. 
 
Klein, B., R. Crawford and A. Alchian. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process". Journal of Law and Economics 21, no 2 (1978): 297-326.  
 
Klein, Peter G. "The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies”. In  Handbook of New 
Institutional Economics, edited by Claude Menard and Mary Shirley, pp. 435-469. Amsterdam: Kluwer, 2005. 
 
Lazonick, William. "Industrial Organization and Technological Change: The Decline of the British Cotton 
Industry". Business History Review 57, no. 2 (1983): 195-236. 
 
Leunig, Timothy. “New Answers to Old Questions: Explaining the Slow Adoption of Ring Spinning in 
Lancashire, 1880-1913”, Journal of Economic History  61, no. 2 (2001): 439-466.   33 
 
Lyons, John S. "Vertical Integration in the British Cotton Industry, 1825-1850: A Revision".  Journal of 
Economic History 45, no. 2 (1985): 419-425. 
 
———. "Powerloom profitability and Steam Power Costs". Explorations in Economic History  24 no. 4 (1987): 
397-400. 
 
MacDonald, James M. “Market Exchange or Vertical Integration: An Empirical Analysis”. Review of Economics 
and Statistics 67 (1985): 327-331. 
 
Madoz, Pascual. Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de  ultramar. Madrid, 
1846. 
 
Maluquer de Motes, Jordi. "La estructura del sector algodonero en Cataluña durante la primera etapa de la 
industrialización (1832-1861)". Hacienda Pública Española 38 (1976): 133-148. 
 
Mass, William and William Lazonick. "The British Cotton Industry and International Competitive Advantage: 
The State of the Debates". Business History 32, no. 4 (1990): 9-65. 
 
Mowery, D.C. (1992). "Finance and Corporate Evolution in Five Industrial Economies, 1900-1950". Industrial 
and Corporate Change 1(1), pp. 1-36  
 
Nadal, Jordi. El fracaso de la Revolución Industrial en España. Barcelona: Ariel, 1974. 
 
———."La indústria cotonera". In Història Económica de la Catalunya contemporània edited by Jordi Nadal, 
Jordi Maluquer de Motes and Francesc Cabana, vol 3, pp. 12-85. Barcelona: Enciclopèdia Catalana, 1991 
 
Nadal, Jordi and Xavier Tafunell. Sant Martí de Provençals, pulmó industrial de  Barcelona: (1847-1992). 
Barcelona: Columna, 1992. 
 
Ohanian,  Nancy Kane. “Vertical Integration in the U.S. Pulp and Paper Industry, 1900-1940”,  Review of 
Economics and Statistics 74 (1994): 202-207.  
 
Orellana, Francisco J. Reseña completa descriptiva y crítica de la Exposición Industrial y Artística de Productos 
del Principado de Cataluña improvisada en Barcelona para obsequiar a S.M. La Reina Doña Isabel II. 
Barcelona: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Jaime Jepús, 1860. 
 
Perry, Martin K., "Vertical Integration: Determinants and Effects". In Handbook of Industrial Organization 
edited by R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig, vol. 1, pp. 183-255. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989.   
 
Prat, Marc and Raimon Soler. “La formación de redes comerciales y el fracaso de la penetración internacional de 
los tejidos catalanes, 1850-1930”, Revista de Historia Industrial 21 (2002): 201-225. 
 
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. "Producción y consumo de tejidos en España, 1800-1913: Primeros resultados". 
In Historia económica y pensamiento social edited by Gonzalo Anes, Luís A. Rojo and Piero Tedde, pp. 455-
471. Madrid: Alianza-Banco de España, 1983.  
 
Ronquillo, José O. Diccionario de materia mercantil, industrial y agrícola.  Barcelona: Imprenta Gaspar, 1851-
1857. 
 
Rose, Mary B. Firms, Networks and Business Values. The British and American Cotton Industries since 1750. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Rosés, Joan R. “The Choice of Technology in the Mediterranean Basin”. In The Mediterranean Response to 
Globalization edited by Sevket Pamuk and Jeffrey D. Williamson, pp. 134-156 London: Routledge, 2000. 
   34 
———. “La competitividad internacional de la industria algodonera catalana”, Revista de Historia Económica, 
Special Issue (2001): 85-109. 
 
———. “Industrialización regional sin crecimiento nacional: La industrialización catalana y el crecimiento 
de la economía española (1830-1861)”, Revista de Historia Industrial 25 (2004): 49-80. 
 
Sánchez, Alejandro. "La era de la manufactura algodonera en Barcelona, 1736-1839".  Estudios de Historia 
Social 48-49 (1989): 65-113. 
 
———. "La indianeria catalana: ¿Mito o realidad?". Revista de Historia Industrial 1 (1992): 213-232. 
 
———. "Crisis económica y respuesta empresarial. Los inicios del sistema fabril en la industria algodonera 
catalana, 1797-1839”. Revista de Historia Económica 18, no. 3 (2000): 485-524. 
 
Sayró, Esteban. Industria algodonera de Cataluña. Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1842. 
 
Shelanski, Howard A. and Peter G. Klein. “Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and 
Assessment”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11(1995): 335-361. 
 
Sicsic, Pierre. "Establishment Size and Economies of Scale in 19th-Century France". Explorations in Economic 
History 31, no. 4 (1994): 453-478. 
 
Solà Parera, Àngels. Aigua, indústria i fabricants a Manresa (1759-1860). Manresa : Centre d’Estudis del 
Bages, 2004. 
 
Stigler, George J. “The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market”. Journal of Political Economy 
59 (1951): 185-193. 
 
Taylor, A.J. “Concentration and Specialization in the Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1825-1850”,  Economic 
History Review 1 (1949): 114-122. 
 
Temin, Peter.  "Product Quality and Vertical Integration in the Early Cotton Textile Industry".  Journal of 
Economic History 48, no. 4 (1988): 891-907. 
 
Thomson, James K.J. A Distinctive Industrialisation. Cotton in Barcelona: 1728-1832. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
 
———. "Technological Transfer to the Catalan Cotton Industry: From Calico Printing to the Self-acting Mule”. 
In The Fibre that Changed the World. The Cotton Industry in International Perspective, 1600-1990s, edited by 
Douglas A. Farnie and David J. Jeremy, pp. 249-282. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Von Tunzelmann, G.N. Steam Power and British Industrialization to 1860. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. 
 
Williamson, O.E. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free  Press, 1975. 
 
———. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free  Press, 1985. 
 
———. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Appendix: Estimating production capacity of cotton firms 
  The sources of this study are the two major surveys conducted during the period on the Catalan cotton 
industry. The survey of 1850 (Junta de Fabricas de Cataluña, Censo de fabricas) was divided in three parts: the 
first devoted to  the cotton spinning establishments, the second to the cotton and mixed-fabrics weaving   35 
established and the third to printing establishments. It seems that survey covered all the establishments located in 
whatever part of Catalonia. For each category, the survey listed name of the firm, location of the establishment, 
the amount and type of machinery in use and operatives. Also, in the case of cotton and mixed fabrics weaving, 
the survey collected the amount of machinery stopped by the industrial crisis. The industrial guide for 1861 
(Gimenez Guited, Guia fabril) collected data on all cotton firms located in Catalonia. It seems that the original 
data was drawn from the records of the industrial tax. The data was similar to those collected in the previous 
survey. However, unlike the census for 1850, it did not separate workers across the different phase since 
aggregate them by establishment and firm.  
  These two surveys did not recorded data on the actual production of each firm. But given that different 
types of spindles and looms produced different amounts of product per year, one can derive from the machinery 
figures the amount of production capacity in Tons per year of each firm. According to the sources, the average 
production capacity of the different type of spindles were of: 3 Kg. per year in hand-spindles; 11Kg. per year in 
mule-jennies powered by horses; 15 Kg. per year in throstles; 20 Kg. per year for mule-jennies steam or water 
powered; and 23 Kg. per year for self-acting mules. Similarly, the average production capacity of the hand-
looms was of 280 Kg. per year and those of power-looms was of 1400 Kg. per year. The sources of these figures 
are Sayró, Industria algodonera, Figuerola, Estadística and Comisión especial arancelaria, Información.  
  Employing the figures of estimated production, one may compute the coverage of the sample by 
dividing the corresponding values (collected in table 1) by the amount of yarn and cloth production furnished in 
Rosés (“Industrialización regional”, p. 74-75). Thus, in 1850 the coverage of cotton spinning is 99.77 percent 
and 93.89 percent in cotton weaving; in 1861 this coverage is of 94.75 percent in cotton spinning and is 95.74 
percent in cotton weaving. 